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THE OHIO DIVISION OF SECURITIES:
RULEMAKING, THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT AND THE OHIO
SECURITIES BULLETIN
The Ohio Division of Securities began publication of the Ohio
Securities Bulletin, which was intended to be the division's official
means of communication to the securities industry of Ohio, in May
1973. The bulletin was designed primarily as a medium for expression
of division views, policies, and interpretations concerning the admin-
istration of the securities laws in Ohio, and secondarily as a means
of disseminating information concerning issuer filings with the divi-
sion and actions taken on license applications. The bulletin was con-
ceived as a step toward openness in the administration of the laws.,
However, it soon became clear that it is very difficult to separate
disclosure of the inner workings of an agency from legislation by that
agency. Although the division asserted in the first issue that the mat-
ters contained in the bulletin would not be subject to the Ohio Admin-
istrative Procedure Act,2 that view has been questioned by members
of the securities bar.3
The purpose of this note is to demonstrate that certain of the
matters discussed in the bulletin are rules, and that the Ohio Admin-
istrative Procedure Act is therefore applicable to the process of devel-
oping and publishing much of the bulletin. Compliance with the Ohio
Administrative Procedure Act would require that the division give
notice of its intent to promulgate a rule, grant interested parties an
opportunity to present their views on the proposed rule, and publish
the resulting rule. It is further argued that the added burden of com-
pliance with the Administrative Procedure Act ought not cause the
division to abandon its announced policy of openness. Disclosure of
policies and standaids is not a matter of grace, but merely good
administration, and may be mandated by statute. Where an agency
takes the type of action that gives rise to the need for the protection
afforded by disclosure and hearing, attempts to avoiding giving that
protection should be examined with suspicion.
I. THE OHIO SECURITIES BULLETIN AS RULEMAKING
An agency can become subject to the Ohio Administrative Prod-
OHIO SECURITIES BULLETIN, May 1973, at 1.
Id. at 9.
OHIO SECURITIES BULLETIN, Vol. II, No. 4, at 2.
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ucedure Act4 [hereinafter, APA] in two ways. First, the APA is appl-
icable to any "official, board, or commission having authority to
promulgate rules."' 5 Second, the "functions of any administrative or
executive officer, department, division, bureau, board, or commission
of the government of the state specifically made subject to sections
119.01 to 119.13, inclusive, of the Revised Code" are governed by the
APA.6 In carrying out its duty of administering the Ohio Securities
Act,7 the Ohio Division of Securities is made subject to the APA
under both approaches. The division's enabling legislation requires it
to prescribe "rules and regulations regarding the sale of securities, the
administration of sections 1707.01 to 1707.45, inclusive, of the Re-
vised Code, and the procedure and practice before the division."
Moreover, this statute granting rulemaking powers begins with the
preamble: "In addition to fulfilling the requirements of sections
119.01 to 119.13, inclusive, of the revised code . . . . 8 It is clear,
then, that if the division does engage in rulemaking, the APA will
apply. The determination is more than academic; the validity and
enforceability of the matters contained in the bulletin turn upon
whether those matters are "rules." It does not, for purposes of the
APA, turn on the wisdom of the policy behind those matters.
The publication of the Ohio Securities Bulletin began with high
hopes for improved administration of the Ohio Securities Act. In the
first issue, Commissioner William L. Case III explained that his
primary goal was to aid those who genuinely sought full compliance
with the securities act by publishing the rules, statements of policy,
and policy guidelines, collectively known as "regulatory standards,"
that the division would use in discharging its regulatory functions.9
OHIo REv. CODE § 119.01 et seq. (1969).
' OtIo REV. CODE § 119.01 (1969).
6 Id.
7 OHfo REV. CODE § 1707.01 et seq. (1964).
' OHlo REV. CODE § 1707.20 (1964).
1 One of the most frequent criticisms of the Division which has been related to
me during the last five months is that with virtually no written regulatory standards
and no regular and continuous method of communicating its policies to persons who
are subject to its regulation, the Division puts a particularly onerous burden upon
those who genuinely seek full compliance with such policies. It is in recognition of
the legitimacy of such criticism and of the fact that this lack of communication has
compounded the difficulty for the Division of exercising its regulatory functions, that
this Ohio Securities Bulletin has been created. Probably the most significant feature
of this bulletin will be the material published regularly under the heading
"Regulatory Standards." This Publication will be the principal outlet, and therefore,
the principal source of reference, for Division Rules, Statements of Policy, Forms,
and Written Policy Guidelines. . . , both adopted and proposed, which will collec-
tively represent the expressed regulatory standards of the Division as they are formu-
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As those regulatory standards were given content, however, the result
was rulemaking within the meaning of the APA. Therefore, any regu-
latory standard promulgated would be of no force or effect unless
promulgated in compliance with the APA. 1
Two particular matters attracted the division's attention when
the bulletin was first published: the standards to be used in determin-
ing whether an issue was offered on substantively fair terms and the
sale of foreign real estate in Ohio. Under Ohio Rev. Code §§ 1707.09
and 1707.13, the division is empowered to determine whether any
given offering within its jurisdiction is fair in substance. In June and
August of 1973, the division began publishing the standards which it
intended to use in making a determination of fairness with respect to
issuance of securities.1" Among the aspects of an offering covered by
these "written policy guidelines" were offering price, capitalization
of newly organized issuers, compensation of promoters, selling proce-
dures, and the rights of the security holders. The guidelines asserted
that the division might, in its discretion, refuse registration of any
security which failed to conform to those guidelines.12
In the area of foreign real estate registration, the division devel-
oped and published a comprehensive regulatory system designed to
protect Ohio investors. The Ohio Securities Act's definition of "secu-
rity" includes "real estate not situated in this state and any interest
in real estate not situated in this state." 3 Thus, the test of substan-
tive fairness is applicable to offerings of foreign real estate to Ohio
investors. The guidelines developed for the sale of foreign real estate
range from simple disclosure requirements" to a requirement that the
offering price not exceed the fair market value of the land as deter-
mined by a qualified independent appraiser.15
A. Actions That Constitute Rulemaking
The APA applies whenever an agency subject to its provisions
promulgates a "rule." The question then becomes whether the devel-
opment and publication of regulatory standards in the bulletin
lated, in perhaps the most significant new undertaking of the Division, during the
months to come.
OHIO SECURITIES BULLETIN, May 1973, at 1.
1o OHIO REV. CODE § 119.02 (1969).
" OHIO SECURITIES BULLETIN, June 1973, at 9; OHIO SECURITIES BULLETIN, August 1973,
at 5.
12 OHIO SECURITIES BULLETIN, June 1973, at 9.
'3 OHIO REV. CODE § 1707.01(B) (Supp. 1974).
4 OHIO SECURITIES BULLETIN, Vol. II, No. 3, at 14.
" Id. at 17.
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amount to rulemaking within the meaning of the APA. A "rule," for
purposes of that statute, is "any rule, regulation, or standard, having
a general and uniform operation, adopted, promulgated, and en-
forced by any agency under the authority of the laws governing such
agency, but it does not include regulations concerning internal man-
agement of the agency which do not affect private rights."16 Once it
is decided that a particular communication or action is a "rule," no
action can be taken on the matter except under certain conditions.
The heart of the policy behind the APA is the requirement of a
hearing at which citizen input is accepted,17 and the publication of the
resulting action."8 Failure to comply with these requirements makes
the rule so promulgated invalid."9
The meaning of the term "rule" has not been frequently litigated
in Ohio;2" however, judicial decisions under the federal Administra-
tive Procedure Act2 l are more numerous. The federal act has a differ-
ent definition of "rule" so that the cases cannot be dispositive of
questions under Ohio law. However, there is enough similarity in the
statutes so that the reasoning used by federal courts can be helpful
in determining the type of quasi-legislative conduct that is considered
rulemaking. 2 In defining "rule" for purposes of the federal APA, the
court in American Express Co. v. United States2 3 said that the na-
ture of rulemaking is essentially legislative. As such, it is concerned
with creating policy for the future rather than the evaluation of past
conduct. Rulemaking looks not to evidentiary fact finding but to
policy decisions to be made on the basis of facts.
Rulemaking need not be explicitly legislative, however. The fact
that an agency acts, rather than drafts, is not necessarily fatal to an
argument that rulemaking is occurring. In P.A.M. News Corp. v.
,1 OHIO REV. CODE § 119.01(C) (Supp. 1974).
17 OHIO REV. CODE § 119.03 (1969).
" OHIO REV. CODE § 119.04 (1969).
, OHIO REV. CODE § 119.02 (1969).
20 The only reported case construing Ohio Rev. Code § 119.01(C) is Lloyd v. Indus.
Comm'r, 119 Ohio App. 467, 200 N.E.2d 705 (1964).
21 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (1970).
n The federal statute defines "rule" more fully but not necessarily more broadly. One
difference between the statutes is that a federal rule is of "general or particular applicability,"
5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1970), while an Ohio rule is something of "general and uniform operation,"
OHIO REV. CODE § 119.01(C) (1969). Thus it could be argued that federal cases are inapplicable,
since the federal definition is more sweeping. The words "or particular," however, should be
read out of the federal statute. It has been said that the language represents an excess of
legislative zeal and cannot be read literally, or every agency action would be a rule under federal
law. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1959).
- 472 F.2d 1050 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
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Hardin,24 the Department of Argriculture's decision to institute an
agricultural data news service in competition with the plaintiff's pri-
vate service was held to be a rule. The court was apparently per-
suaded by the argument that, prior to such action, the department
ought to give reasoned consideration to facts and arguments pre-
sented by those who would be affected by the decision.25
Apparently, a rule can be implied from a consistent course of
conduct. In Oil Shale Corp. v. Morton, 2 it was held that the Depart-
ment of Interior's policy of twenty-five years stating that oil shale
claims would not be voided for failure to perform assessement work
on the claim, amounted to a rule. The Department of Interior could
not, therefore, refuse to issue mineral patents to the plaintiff-claim
owners merely because of failure to perform the assessment work.
The court emphasized that claim holders ought to be able to rely on
the uniformly applied policy which the department had followed in
numerous previous instances.27
The definitional problem often arises where an agency's choice
of methods for problem solving is questioned. In Regular Common
Carrier Conference v. United States,21 the plaintiff attacked the In-
terstate Commerce Commission's action of removing certain restric-
tions from approximately 250 interstate carrier certificates by a rule-
making procedure, rather than case-by-case adjudication. It was held
that the action was rulemaking. The court stated that adjudication
would be appropriate where an agency must make a decision in a
particular situation in which the individual parties have more knowl-
edge of the situation but that rulemaking is appropriate where a
policy is to be made based on the general characteristics of an entire
industry.29
A leading commentator has said that any attempt to define
"rulemaking" will lead to confusion and the distinction is that rule-
making results when an agency engages in legislative conduct. 0 But
accounting for the factors considered in the above-cited cases and the
policy behind the Administrative Procedure Act, a general theme
emerges. If the information which an agency requires to act in the
best interests of the public can be gathered only from the class of
24 440 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
Id. at 258 n. 4.
2B 370 F. Supp. 108 (D.C. Colo. 1973).
1 Id. at 123.
21 307 F. Supp. 941 (D.D.C. 1969).
21 See also WBEN, Inc. v. United States, 396 F.2d 601 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 393 U.S.
914 (1968).
11 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 84 (1959).
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persons subject to the agency's jurisdiction, rulemaking is the proper
agency response.3' When a problem becomes so widespread in the
agency's area of authority that general prospective action is needed,
rulemaking becomes advantageous for both the agency and those
affected. For the agency, it is more economical to legislate than to
proceed on an ad hoc basis; furthermore, the agency would be pro-
ceeding with valuable input from the public, rather than acting on its
own limited information. For the public, considerations of fairness
militate for the notice of agency action to be published and for the
public to be given an open hearing on the reasonableness of the
impending action. Any agency action taken in response to a problem
which ought to be solved legislatively should be held to be rulemak-
ing, regardless of the actual method employed. In short, "rulemak-
ing" must be defined in the context of the policy of openness and
public input expressed by the Ohio APA. If considerations of fairness
and efficiency make those policies applicable to agency action, an
agency should not be able to argue that it is not making rules.
B. Is the Publication of the OHIO SECURITIES BULLETIN
Rulemaking?
The division is aware of the problems of administrative law
inherent in the bulletin, as evidenced by the Commissioner's view on
the APA frequently contained in the bulletin. For example, an article
in the first issue attempted to distinguish the different types of regula-
tory standards on the basis of the division's theories on the different
effects of the standards (i.e. "statements of policy" are standards
having "a general operation adopted for the purpose of implementing
the authority of the Division . .')."3 Written policy guidelines are
similar to policy statements, but are standards which are in the pro-
cess of being formulated and are not yet suitable for publication as a
policy statement. Despite the fact that policy guidelines are not as
complete as policy statements, the division reserves the right to im-
plement guidelines at any time without publication or notice.33 The
only standards which the division considers to be "rules" are those
standards which are promulgated in compliance with the Administra-
tive Procedure Act.34 Apparently, no standard can be a rule in the
division's view unless the division chooses to proceed under the Act.
11 Bernstein, The NLRB's Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma Under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, 79 YALE L.J. 571, 616-17 (1970).
"2 OHIO SECURITIES BULLETIN, May 1973, at 8.
33 Id.
34 Id.
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The definition leaves the decision of whether a standard is to be a rule
to be made by the division itself.
In the development of these written policy guidelines, the divi-
sion claims virtual exemption from the Administrative Procedure
Act. The Commissioner reasoned that since the division could de-
velop regulatory standards in connection with specific adjudications
without complying with the APA, the division could also develop
regulatory standards having the effect of rules without compliance
with the APA.5 Furthermore, although the division reserved the
right to apply its regulatory standards as rules, the Commissioner
said that compliance with the regulatory standards would not neces-
sarily preclude unfavorable action by the division. The Commissioner
apparently saw the regulatory standards as a system of law which was
binding upon the industry, but not upon the division."
Some of the problems with the division's current policies regard-
ing the procedure for adopting its regulatory standards and the effect
of those standards are illuminated by the two specific examples men-
tioned earlier in the paper. The first example involved the determina-
tion of whether an issue was offered on substantively fair terms. In
particular, the division promulgated a regulatory standard containing
four tests for determining whether the price of a proposed offering is
grossly unfair. Under the first test, the division announced that it
would hold any offering to be grossly unfair under Ohio Rev. Code §
1707.09 if its price exceeded the product of twenty-five times the net
earnings per share of the issuer for the last accounting period.37 In
the recent market, twenty-five times earnings would seem to be a
generous ceiling, and the standard may be criticized for being too
loose; however, it is unknown how the precise multiple was selected.
Certainly the division could not have proceeded on the assumption
that any security selling at twenty-five times earnings is intrinsically
unfair. In the not too distant past, such a standard would have been
irrelevant to any concept of fairness. For example, in 1960, the fol-
33 It is the interpretation of the Division of Securities of Chapers 1707 and 119
of the Ohio Revised Code that regulatory standards of the Division may be adopted
for application in the exercise of substantive judgments in connection with specific
adjudications required by the Ohio Securities Act without compliance with the proce-
dure prescribed in Sections 119.01 to 119.13, inclusive. Therefore, Statements of
Policy, Forms, Written Policy Guidelines, and Unwritten Policies of the Division will
be considered to be in all respects equivalent to Rules of the Division and will be
applied accordingly.
Id. at 9.
36 Id.
7 OHIO SECURITIES BULLETIN, June 1973, at 12.
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lowing common stocks sold at earnings multiples exceeding twenty-
five:3"
Issuer Price-Earnings Ratio
Alcoa 48.0
du Pont 27.5
Eastman Kodak 34.9
General Electric 37.7
Under another test, the division may block the sale of a security
if its price exceeds the net book value per share of the issuer's tangible
assets. 9 Yet the asset value of common stock is widely regarded as
a meaningless figure,40 since the price of common stock depends on
the earning power of the issuer, rather than the value of assets held
by the issuer. Although the net book value test only applies to a
company which has no securities being actively traded or has had no
net earnings in the last accounting period, this test makes the price
of any securities sold equal to no more than the shareholder's portion
of the firm's value if liquidated. Even in the context of a start-up
company, an investor must be anticipating receipt of more than a pro
rata share of tangible assets-he is anticipating future earnings. The
price of the security ought to be allowed to reflect that expectation.
Neither the earnings multiple nor the book value standards is neces-
sarily unreasonable. However, contrary to the purposes of the APA,
the division has made a decision without the benefit of citizen input.
The standards developed for the sale of foreign real estate also
have occupied large portions of the bulletin. They range from in-
creased disclosure requirements to price ceilings. For the purpose of
ensuring effective disclosure, the division intends to require that the
seller of foreign real estate read verbatim the offering circular to the
prospective purchaser. 4' It has been suggested, however, that an
investor relies more on second-hand information gleaned from disclo-
sure documents by professionals, rather than his own analysis of the
information. 42 If so, forcing a seller to read the disclosure document
aloud is unlikely to add to the purchaser's knowledge. While the
requirement will probably be no more than an annoyance, it was
" GRAHAMt, DODD & COTTLE, SECURITY ANALYSIS 232 (1962).
"' OHIO SECURITIES BULLETIN, June 1973, at 13.
11 In two industries, public utilities and financial companies, the figure is of importance.
These industries, however, are the exception. GRAHAM, DODD & CorLE, supra note 38, at 216.
4' OHIO SECURITIES BULLETIN, Vol. II, No. 3, at 14.
" Kripke, The S.E.C., the Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities, 45 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 1151 (1970).
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adopted without allowing the industry a chance to argue that its
operations should not be burdened with time consuming, if innocu-
ous, requirements.
A second requirement of the foreign real estate standard creates
even greater problems. The division states that it will limit the offer-
ing price of foreign real estate to its fair market value as evidenced
by a report prepared by an independent appraiser acceptable to the
division." Furthermore, the division has expressed the intent to limit
the qualification of foreign real estate to a period of twelve months,
after which time re-registration with another substantive fairness ex-
amination will be required. 44 Since the offeror must bear the expense
of gathering information for such an examination," the expense of a
yearly appraisal could, if the requirement is strictly enforced, prevent
smaller developers from selling in Ohio. The division's concern with
the sale of foreign real estate is justifiable since offering real estate
to a buyer geographically removed from the land presents opportuni-
ties for fraud. The division's solution, however, may have the effect
of preventing some meritorious offerings in Ohio.
The issue is not -whether the standards published for qualifying
foreign real estate and judging the substantive fairness of an offering
are reasonable; they may or may not be. The question is whether they
and other such pronouncements in the Ohio Securities Bulletin are
rules, which must be promulgated in accordance with the Ohio Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act. The particular standards discussed above
seem to be rules. They are to be applied generally and uniformly, in
keeping with the Ohio definition of rules, and they are to be applied
prospectively. More importantly, the guidelines amount to a type of
comprehensive regulatory scheme which ought to be adopted only
after careful consideration. The Ohio Administrative Procedure Act
expresses a policy of favoring public hearings before the adoption of
any such scheme; the definition of "rulemaking" and the applicability
of the APA ought to be considered in the light of that policy. The
standards announced in the bulletin are comprehensive, drawn with
precision, and designed to affect a large industry and a significant
segment of Ohio citizens. Drawing such standards without the benefit
of formal input from industry and general sources ignores the policy
behind the APA.
13 OHIO SECURITIES BULLETIN, Vol. II, No. 3, at 17.
OHIO SECURITIES BULLETIN, Dec. 1973, at 9.
,5 OHIO REV. CODE § 1707.09(K) (1964).
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II. RULEMAKING OUTSIDE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
ACT.
The division is currently reassessing its use of the Ohio Securities
Bulletin and bulletin publication has been discontinued pending a
determination concerning the need for such a document. 6 The future
course of disclosure and rulemaking is uncertain. The division is now
soliciting input from the securities bar and industry concerning many
of the matters dealt with in the bulletin. It would be beneficial to all
concerned if the division were to pursue a course of rulemaking in
full compliance with the APA, whether or not the bulletin continues
as the medium of communication. Treating disclosure of policy as a
matter of grace and relying on ad hoc adjudication or the exercise of
discretion, as has been done in the past, is a grievously flawed ap-
proach.
The division must operate with some standards if it is to dis-
charge its duties. The substantive fairness of an offering, for example,
must be judged by something more relevant than a division em-
ployee's disposition on any given day. A decision to abandon the
bulletin and a refusal to promulgate rules therefore, would mean that
the division had decided to follow one or more of three courses of
action: adjudication on an ad hoc basis, exercise of its discretion, or
use of non-public standards. Each of these three actions will be exam-
ined in the following sections with particular focus on the legality of
each and possible remedies through the courts.
A. Adjudication as an Alternative to Rulemaking
The division is vested with the power to proceed against sus-
pected violations of the Ohio Securities Act through statutory adjudi-
cation procedures,47 initiating criminal proceedings," suspending or
revoking dealers' licenses,49 enjoining violations of the securities act,5"
or enjoining the issuance or sale of securities for procedural irregular-
ities.51 Commissioner Case has argued that the division, as an alterna-
tive to rulemaking, could proceed by adjudication in particular in-
stances and thereby establish law without pursuing formal rulemak-
ing. He also argued that the choice between rulemaking and adjudica-
46 Letter to subscribers of the OHIO SECURITIES BULLETIN from Commissioner James S.
Reece, Feb. 25, 1975.
" OHIO Rtv. CODE § 1707.23 (1964).
" OHIo REV. CODE § 1707.23(E) (1964).
" OHIO REV. CODE § 1707.23(D) (1964).
' OHIO REv. CODE § 1707.26 (1964).
51 OHIO REV. CODE § 1707.25 (1964).
36 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL 662 (1975)
tion is solely a matter within the division's discretion.-, To the extent
that federal administrative law is similar to that of Ohio, that position
is partially supported by S.E.C. v. Chenery13 In that case, the Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission, in approving a reorganization plan
under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935,11 ordered
that the preferred stock of the company, purchased by management
during the period of reorganization, be surrendered to the company
at cost plus interest, rather than be converted into stock of the new
company along with other shares of the same class. The Supreme
Court approved the Commission's action notwithstanding an attack
based on the failure to develop a rule governing the matter. The Court
held that the choice between proceeding by rulemaking or ad hoc
decisions is one that lies within the discretion of the agency. To render
the action invalid, as was urged by the officers and directors, would
be to hold that the failure of the Commission to anticipate the prob-
lem and legislate a rule in response would invalidate agency action
taken in the valid discharge of the agency's adjudicatory duties.5
Chenery was questioned in N.L.R.B. v. Wyman-Gordon Co.5"
That case involved the National Labor Relation Board's attempt to
enforce an order directing an employer to surrender to the union a
list of all its employees. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
held57 that the order could not be enforced because it was based on a
rule developed by adjudication in a prior case, Excelsior Under-
wear. 8 The Supreme Court majority agreed with the appellate court's
rationale, holding that the provisions of the federal APA may not be
avoided by the process of making rules through adjudication, and
that the Excelsior Underwear rule was therefore invalid. However, in
this instance, the employer had been directed in a lawful adjudicatory
proceeding to comply with the order reached in that proceeding,
rather than a prior rule established by adjudication. The First Circuit
was therefore reversed and the order enforced. The remaining justices
concurred in the result but disagreed with the language concerning
rulemaking, feeling that Chenery should control.
The holding of Chenery was again recognized in dictum in the
recent case of N.L.R.B. v. Bell Aerospace Co.5" The Supreme Court
52 OHIO SECURITIEs BULLETIN, Vol. II, No. 4, at 2.
332 U.S. 1974 (1947).
- 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1970).
11 332 U.S. at 201.
58 394 U.S. 759 (1969).
57 Wyman Gordon Co. v. N.L.R.B., 397 F.2d 394 (1st Cir.), rev'd 394 U.S. 759 (1966).
n 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966).
59 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
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held that the NLRB was not required to proceed by rulemaking
rather than adjudication to determine whether certain employees
were "managerial" and therefore excluded from the coverage of the
NLRA. 0 While the discussion of administrative law is dictum be-
cause the case turned on the statutory interpretation of "manage-
rial," Bell Aerospace does indicate a willingness on the part of the
Court to return to Chenery.
The Ohio courts have also struggled with the issue of whether
an agency has absolute discretion to proceed by adjudication or rule-
making. The questicn has never been definitely settled by the Su-
preme Court of Ohio. A recent Ohio appellate decision, In re Appli-
cation of Blue Cross,1 has specifically rejected the Chenery approach
for purposes of the Ohio Administrative Procedure Act. The superin-
tendent of insurance had attempted, in a ratemaking hearing, to
impose certain duties upon Blue Cross to exert pressure on member
hospitals concerning increasing costs. As in Wyman-Gordon, how-
ever, a holding that the adjudicative rulemaking was invalid was of
no help to the complaining party. The Superintendent was required
to approve or reject Blue Cross' proposed rates but did not have the
power to modify them, and therefore the proposed rates were re-
jected.
The problem of whether an agency can make law through adju-
dication is inherent in granting one body both adjudicatory and legis-
lative functions. Even if it is the law that the division cannot, in its
discretion, proceed by adjudication to make rules, what is a com-
plaining party's remedy? The division should be allowed a reasonable
amount of time to proceed against a particular problem through case-
by-case adjudication. At some point, however, it must become appar-
ent that the problem is ripe for a legislative remedy and that such a
remedy would be more economical to the agency and more equitable
for the public. If the division still refuses to promulgate rules, an
affected party's remedy would be available only if the courts were
willing to reverse a particular adjudication for failure to proceed by
rulemaking. Chenery can be read to say that in a particular case, an
agency's decision should not be reversed for failure to anticipate a
problem and legislate accordingly."2 That reading would leave open
the question of whether an agency's knowing refusal to promulgate
rules in the face of an industry-wide problem should be penalized
upon judicial review. If the courts were to answer in the affirmative,
29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1973).
SI 40 Ohio App. 2d 285, 318 N.E.2d 212, (Franklin 1973).
12 332 U.S. at 201.
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it would put them in the position of reversing an agency's adjudica-
tion, correct on the merits, for reasons not relevant to the subject
matter of particular adjudication. It may be, however, that courts
reviewing administrative adjudication will be willing to put them-
selves in such a position. Chenery does not hold that the agency has
absolute discretion to choose between rulemaking and adjudication;
it holds that the choice lies primarily in the informed discretion of
the agency.63 The Court also said that the SEC's function of adminis-
tering the securities laws should be performed "as much as possible,
through this quasi-legislative promulgation of rules to be applied in
the future." 4 Such a sentiment may mark an increased willingness
to pressure administrative agencies to move to rulemaking at a point
where such action is appropriate. 5 It has been argued that the ulti-
mate result in Wyman-Gordon-the decision not to reverse the
NLRB's adjudication even though the Board failed to properly pro-
mulgate rules-was dictated merely by a practical consideration:
holding that rules made by adjudication could in no instance be en-
forced would throw the Board's work into chaos. The language of
Wyman-Gordon, repeated in Bell Aerospace, regarding the choice
between rulemaking and adjudication, however, may mean that the
exclusively adjudicatory approach will not long be tolerated." If an
agency consistently avoids a rulemaking approach where clearly ap-
propriate, the courts may decide to invalidate orders developed
through adjudication in spite of the chaotic effect on the process of
administration.6 7
B. The Use of Discretionary Powers as an Alternative to
Rulemaking
The division points to its discretionary power in arguing that it
cannot be forced to develop, publish, and apply regulatory stan-
dards.68 Indeed, the Ohio Securities Act does contemplate seemingly
unfettered use of discretion. The division may allow registration by
qualification of an issue "[i]f the division finds" it to be substantively
fair.69 Foreign real estate may be qualified for sale in Ohio "[i]f the
division is of the opinion" that the offering is on substantively fair
13 Id. at 203.
Id. at 202.
K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 607-08 (1970 Supp.).
" Bernstein, supra note 31 at 604.
I7 d. at 620.
s OHIO SECURITIES BULLETIN, Vol. II, No. 4, at 2.
" OHIO REV. CODE § 1707.09(K) (1964).
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terms." And securities sold without compliance with the statute may
be qualified after sale "if it appears to the division" that no investor
has been defrauded or damaged.71
If the Commissioner's position is that the division's discretion-
ary powers allow it to adopt and apply rules without compliance with
the Ohio APA, he is ignoring the clear language of the APA. To
accept such an argument would be to write into the law an exemption
for the division, allowing it to adopt rules for the exercise of its
discretion without hearing or publication. Yet, if the particular mat-
ter is a rule, compliance with the APA is mandated; exemptions from
the Ohio act, as with the federal, are not easily implied.7 2
As with adjudication, the unstructured use of discretion is a poor
substitute for properly promulgated rules,and generally should be
abandoned in favor of rulemaking. For an example of the relationship
between discretionary regulation and rulemaking, the division might
look to the Securities and Exchange Commission. In its practice of
issuing no-action letters, the SEC is operating in a discretionary
capacity. A no-action letter means only that the Commission will not
act on the particular situation involved, for any number of reasons,
as, for example, the hardship imposed by demanding rigid compli-
ance with the statute. 3 The letter may or may not result from the
Commission's interpretation of the statute; it merely informs the
recipient that no action will be taken. Yet, when a problem becomes
so widespread that a discretionary approach is unwarranted, the SEC
proceeds by rulemaking. The promulgation of rule 144, 7 for example,
was in response to an increasing number of requests for no-action
letters on the secondary distribution problem. After the rule was
promulgated, the SEC no longer considered the problem to be one
in which the use of discretion, through no-action letters, was appro-
priate. 6
C. Remedies for Use of Non-Public Standards
The problem of discretion and adjudication as alternatives to
rulemaking raises a basic question: whether the division can refuse
10 OHio REV. CODE § 1707.33(G) (Supp. 1974).
SOfolO REV. CODE § 1707.39 (1964).
72 Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955).
7 Lockhart, S.E.C. No-Action Letters: Informal Advice As a Discretionary Administra-
tive Clearance, 37 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 95 (1972).
74 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1974).
71 Lockhart, note 73 supra at 96.
71 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5223 (Jan. 11, 1972), CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 78,487.
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to make any rules to guide the conduct of the Ohio securities indus-
try. The division formerly admitted that such action would be "irre-
sponsible, 77 and the industry would certainly agree that it would be
unfair. But does the investing public or the securities industry have
any remedy if such action is nevertheless taken?
The Ohio Securities Act provides a defrauded purchaser with
two remedies against the seller. If the sale results from the falseness
of any material statement in a selling document, the seller is liable
to the purchaser for any loss or damages.7 1 If the sale is in any way
violative of any provision of the securities act, the investor has a right
of rescission .7 A case can be hypothesized, however, wherein a sale
could be made on terms that are grossly unfair to the purchaser, yet
the selling documents could be completely truthful. The unfairness of
the terms would not necessarily be a violation of any provision of the
act and therefore the purchaser would have no rescission remedy
under the securities act. If there is no misrepresentation in the selling
documents, then the purchaser would have no cause of action.under
the statutory fraud section.
If this security has been examined by the division and released
for sale, the investor ought to be able to assume that the division is
satisfied that the terms of the sale are not grossly unfair; by hypothe-
sis, however, the terms have turned out to be unfair. Barred from
asserting a cause of action against the seller, the purchaser may be
able to proceed against the division for a failure to develop and
publish standards for testing substantive fairness so that the industry
and the public will know the extent of the protection resulting from
the division's initial examination. The passage of the court of claims
statute,8" waiving the state's sovereign immunity, may attract such
claims. The problems in such a claim are imposing. For example, can
a claim be made against an officer for non-feasance of a statutory
duty? If so, is there a duty imposed upon the division to use any
rational basis for qualifying securities, breach of which should give
rise to a claim for damages by an injured citizen? Such issues would
be ones of first impression in the court of claims.
A problem with such a cause of action that has received some
attention, however, and one which is relevant to the duties of the
division, is the discretionary function doctrine developed under var-
ious government tort claims statutes. In a leading case under the
" OHIO SECURITIES BULLETIN, Vol. II, No. 4, at 2.
78 OHIO REV. CODE § 1707.41 (1964).
79 OHIO REV. CODE § 1707.43 (1964).
" OHIO REV. CODE § 2743.01 et seq. (Supp. 1974).
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Federal Tort Claims Act,81 the Supreme Court held 2 that the statu-
tory discretionary function exemption 3 insulated public officers
from liability arising out of their duties on a "planning" level, as
differentiated from ordinary "operational" level duties. Such* an anal-
ysis would seem to insulate the division from liability for failure to
develop regulatory standards, because the division, as noted above,
is vested with a great degree of discretion in administering the securi-
ties act.
A more recent decision interpreting the discretionary function
exemption of a state statute may signal a new approach to the prob-
lem. In Johnson v. California,84 the California Supreme Court held
that the statutory exception, similar in wording to the federal, was
not available to a state youth authority that had allowed a couple to
adopt a boy with known homicidal tendencies, without warning the
couple. Reviewing a claim arising from the boy's attack on the adop-
tive mother, the court said that only basic policy decisions are insu-
lated from judicial review; failure to warn in the circumstances of the
Johnson case was not the sort of function sought to be protected by
the discretionary function doctrine. Exercise of discretionary func-
tions of the sort which should be immune, the court noted, involves
conscious consideration of the risks and benefits of a particular
course of action. Such an analysis would deny the discretionary func-
tion defense to an agency official faced with a claim that he had failed
altogether to exercise his power to protect the public. If the California
analysis is followed in Ohio, it would mean that if the division made
no inquiry into the fairness of an issue and that issue was released to
the public, a claim by an injured investor would lie.
If the investing public at present has an inadequate remedy for
failure to develop regulatory standards, an issuer is in an even less
favorable position. An issuer seeking to market securities in Ohio has
a legitimate need to know the standards that will be applied by the
division in passing upon the merits of his offering. If the division has
promulgated a rule covering the issuer's situation, he may have an
opportunity for judicial review of that rule. 5 Also, if the division
28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1965).
" Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). The discretionary function exemption may be statutory or, as in
the case of certain state tort claim statutes, judge-made. See, e.g., Alva Steamship Co. v. City
of New York, 405 F.2d 962 (2d Cir. 1969).
" 69 Cal.2d 782, 73 Cal. Rptr. 447, 240 P.2d 352 (1968).
447 P.2d 352 (1968).
,5 OHIo REV. CODE § 119.11(1969) seems to give any affected person the right to judicial
review of administrative rulemaking. That section however, has received a restrictive interpreta-
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denies qualification, the issuer may have a right to judicial review. 6
Neither remedy, however, fulfills the issuer's need to know before-
hand what he must do to comply with the statute.
A prospective issuer may seek to prove that, despite the lack of
any published standards, a rule does exist which ought to be reviewa-
ble. In the Oil Shale Corp.7 case, the district court found that a rule
existed on the basis of a consistently applied and expressed policy.
The facts of that case, however, were unusually one sided: the agency
had followed a consistent course of conduct for twenty-five years and
had addressed a number of letters to inquiring parties advising them
of the policy. The burden of proving that a de facto rule exists in less
clear circumstances would be difficult to meet. First, a party seeking
review would have to discover what the policy was. Discovery of a
policy could be prevented if the division had refused to give reasons
for its actions in any given instance. Secondly, the party would have
the problem of showing that the division has engaged in a course of
conduct over a sufficiently long period of time so that the conduct
would be deemed to be rulemaking.
Even if the remedies discussed above are available to those dam-
aged by a refusal to promulgate rules, they become available only
after the damage is done. The need still exists for a device to force
the commissioner to adopt a systematic rulemaking procedure. An
action in mandamus, for example, might lie to compel the division
to make rules. As a condition to such an action, rulemaking would
first have to be established as an act that is mandatory under the
law. 8 The Ohio Securities Act says that the division "shall" prescribe
forms and "shall" promulgate rules. 9 The word "shall" in a statute
is usually interpreted as mandatory in nature, 0 especially where, as
in the Securities Act, it is frequently repeated." Furthermore, in the
same section of the statute which conferred rulemaking power, the
legislature said that the division "may" publish a list of licensed
tion. Burger Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Commission, 34 Ohio St. 2d 93 (1973); Fortner v.
Thomas, 22 Ohio St. 2d 13 (1970), and was recently declared void under the Ohio constitution.
Rankin-Thoman v. Caldwell, 42 Ohio St. 2d 436 (1975). Judicial review now is available only
under the declaratory judgment statute, OHIO REV. CODE § 2721.03 (Supp. 1974), and then only
at the court's discretion. Burger Brewing Co., supra. See Rutledge, Administrative Review and
the Ohio Modern Courts Amendment, 35 Ohio State L.J. 41 (1974).
s OHIO REV. CODE § 1707.22 (1964).
Supra note 26.
's OHIO REV. CODE § 2731.01 (1954).
sOHlo REV. CODE § 1707.20 (1964).
" Dorrian v. Scioto Conservancy Dist., 27 Ohio St. 2d 102, 201 N.E.2d 834 (1971);
McCrehen v. Brown, 108 Ohio St. 454, 141 N.E. 69 (1923).
11 Cleveland R.R. Co. v. Brescia, 100 Ohio St. 267, 126 N.E. 51 (1919).
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dealers and salesmen. The construction of "shall" as mandatory is
bolstered where the legislature uses that term in contradistinction to
the permissive term "may.' '92
If it can be established that the division has a mandatory duty
to promulgate rules, an action in mandamus would be answered with
the defense that official discretion cannot be controlled by manda-
mus.13 However, a writ of mandamus compelling the Commissioner
to promulgate rules would not be controlling the use of discretion;
such a writ would be moving him into action. When an officer refuses
to act at all, mandamus will issue to compel the performance of a
duty, even though the chosen course of action is within the officer's
discretion.94
A second possible remedy would be legislative in nature. The
Ohio APA would be greatly improved by the addition of a provision
similar to section 4(C)95 of the federal APA. This section grants any
interested party the right to petition and agency for the issuance,
amendment, or repeal of a rule. While the agency has no duty to
respond affirmatively to such a petition, the fact that the agency was
notified of the problem yet failed to act could be relevant to later
agency adjudication on the same problem. In judicial review of such
an adjudication, the fact of a denied petition for rulemaking might
sway an Ohio court to penalize the agency by reversing an adjudica-
tion.
In the absence of a statutory or court imposed duty to engage
in rulemaking, the securities industry must depend upon the good
faith of the division in recognizing and acting on problems ripe for a
legislative solution. Unhappily, the only factor which might force the
division to promulgate rules, through the Ohio Securities Bulletin or
otherwise, is the threat of scandal. The division has expressed concern
over reports of persons representing themselves to issuers as having
influence over the outcome of dealings with the division. The
Commissioner vigorously denied that any division personnel were
involved, and reacted by restricting outside access to information held
by the division. The only solution that would stop such rumors, how-
ever, is the orderly promulgation and publication of standards. Any
agency which seeks to operate under nonpublic standards, or no stan-
92 DeWoody v. Bixler, 136 Ohio St. 263, 25 N.E.2d 341 (1940).
E x parte Black, I Ohio St. 30 (1852).
' Federal Home Properties, Inc. v. Singer, 9 Ohio St. 2d 95, 223 N.E.2d 824 (1967);
Gilder v. Industrial Commission, 100 Ohio St. 500, 127 N.E. 595 (1919); Lake County v.
Ashtabula County, 24 Ohio St. 393 (1873).
95 5 U.S.C. § 553(C) (1970).
" OHIO SECURITIES BULLETIN, June 1973, at 1.
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dards at all, invites the difficulty that the division is seeking to avoid.
If only a small number of persons, through long association with the
division or practice before it, have any idea of what standards the
division uses in exercising its powers, then those persons do have
some influence over the regulatory process. If standards are promul-
gated with input from those to be affected and published for the
benefit of any interested party, then the opportunity to question the
integrity of the process is greatly reduced.
III. CONCLUSION
The Ohio Securities Bulletin is an admirable attempt to struc-
ture operations of the division under such nebulous concepts as "dis-
cretion" and "fairness." The division should recognize, however, that
in publishing regulatory standards it is engaging in the sort of activity
which the Ohio Administrative Procedure Act requires to be preceded
by open information gathering. Compliance with the APA places an
additional burden on the division, making a return to secrecy, ad hoc
decision making, and unfettered use of discretion look attractive. The
existence of legal remedies to prevent such a return is a matter of
speculation. It is very much in the division's interests, as well as in
the public's interest, to proceed with the development of regulatory
standards under the protection provided by the Administrative Proce-
dure Act.
A. Theodore Gardiner
